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Standard welfare analysis of horizontal mergers usually refers to two effects: 
the anticompetitive market power effect reduces welfare by enabling firms to 
charge prices above marginal costs, whereas the procompetitive efficiency ef-
fect increases welfare by reducing the costs of production (synergies). How-
ever, demand-side effects of synergies are usually neglected. We introduce 
them into a standard oligopoly model of horizontal merger by assuming an 
(empirically supported) decrease in labour demand due to merger-specific syn-
ergies and derive welfare effects. We find that efficiency benefits from horizon-
tal mergers are substantially decreased, if involuntary unemployment exists. 
However, in full employment economies, demand-side effects remain negligi-
ble. Eventually, policy conclusions for merger control are discussed. 
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1.  Introduction 
The welfare analysis of mergers usually consists of two elements: the allocative 
effect and the efficiency effect. While the former refers to the welfare loss due 
to the narrowing of the market structure (dead weight loss), the latter analyses 
the effect of efficiency gains from mergers.
1 Such efficiency gains typically 
originate from synergy effects of the integration of two or more companies to a 
single entity, i.e. an (assumed) constant output can post-merger be produced 
with fewer inputs, for instance due to the amalgamation of overhead and ad-
ministration departments like human resources, accounting, executive commit-
tee, etc. According to standard M&A business economics, the reduction of staff 
represents an important source of such kinds of synergy gains.  
 
The usual way of modelling efficiency gains from mergers in industrial eco-
nomics is to analyse the effects from a merger-fuelled decrease in marginal 
costs. However, in doing so, the analysis of the synergy effects remains limited 
to the supply side of the relevant markets (shifts of the supply curve). In con-
trast, possible effects on the demand side, for instance leading to a shift of the 
demand curve, are usually neglected. We contribute to filling this gap by intro-
ducing the demand effects from synergy-driven mergers to a standard welfare 
analysis of horizontal mergers in oligopolies. We find that efficiency benefits 
from horizontal mergers are substantially decreased, sometimes even complete-
ly eroded, if involuntary unemployment exists. In full employment economies, 
demand-side effects remain negligible.  
2.  Literature Overview 
There is surprisingly few literature dealing with mergers/competition and un-
employment. The larger branch is empirical and addresses the employment ef-
                                                            
1   This type of trade-off analysis was pioneered by Williamson (1968) and is immanent in most land-
mark contributions to the modern economic analysis of horizontal mergers (e.g. Farrell & Shapiro 
1990, 2001).  
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fects of mergers. The most comprehensive studies are Conyon et al. (2002) and 
Gugler & Yurtoglu (2004). Conyon et al. (2002) find for the UK that mergers 
and acquisitions lead to a significant decrease in labour demand by the merged 
entity (that also decreases joint output) compared to the pre-merger situation.
2 
This result is generally supported by Gugler & Yurtoglu (2004) finding signifi-
cant and considerable negative effects of merger activity in Europe (in average 
a 10 per cent decrease in labour demand). However, and in line with earlier 
studies (Green & Cromley 1982; Upadhyaya & Mixon 2003), they do not find 
negative effects of merger activity on the unemployment rate in the US. As an 
explanation, Gugler & Yurtoglu (2004) suggest that more rigid and more scle-
rotic labour markets in Europe compared to the U.S. drive the effect. This view 
is additionally supported by the case study from Behar & Hodge (2007). Mar-
golis (2006) finds evidence that mergers and acquisitions lead to a reduction in 
the employment particularly of (comparatively) ‘low-skilled’ workers, a finding 
that fits into this line of reason as sclerotic labour markets usually exert an over-
proportionally adverse effect on low-skilled labour. Altogether, this empirically 
strengthens the reasoning that countries with persistent involuntary unemploy-
ment and sclerotic labour markets experience negative employment effects from 
increasing merger activity because the employees that lose their job in the 
course of post-merger rationalisation cannot find a new job. Thus, those 
economies suffer (consumer) income-wise from mergers & acquisitions. 
 
Most analyses in the theoretical literature in this context focus on the influence 
of the intensity of competition on unemployment and/or the determination of 
wages. One line of reasoning concerns imperfections on labour markets: then, 
promotional effects of intensified product market competition on employment 
are not a matter of course (Koskela & Stenbacka 2005). In another respect, the 
landmark work of d'Aspremont et al. (1984, 1989a, 1989b, 1990) focuses on the 
explanation of involuntary unemployment based on an extended Cournot oli-
                                                            
2   This study somewhat generalises an earlier sector-specific study by Haynes & Thompson (1999) 
that also finds negative employment effects, however, only after an initial temporary increase in la-
bour demand.  
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gopoly model, thereby taking into account the interdependencies between la-
bour and product markets.
3 Producers are assumed to behave according to their 
‘true’ demand curve, i.e. taking into account the total income effect of their de-
cisions on altering the level of employment. Involuntary unemployment then 
results from market imperfections in the product markets – even at a zero wage 
– due to bounded labour demand. Unemployment does not rest on the assump-
tion of an imperfectly competitive labour market and is more likely the lower is 
the degree of competition in product markets. Even though their focus is totally 
different because we do not try to explain the existence of involuntary unem-
ployment, the possible dependence of producers’ decisions on total income – 
mentioned by d’Aspremont et al. – plays a crucial role in our following analy-
sis, in which we regard aspects of mergers and total welfare in a given involun-
tary unemployment environment.  
 
Though total welfare effects of mergers are not discussed, Schniewind (2000) 
analyses the effect of mergers on unemployment in a partial equilibrium Cour-
not competition model. Contrary to our model, a rise in total factor productivity 
due to a merger leads to a positive effect on employment. This positive effect is 
counteracted by a mark-up effect due to lower competition. As a result, lower 
growth in total factor productivity, a smaller number of firms and a larger sector 
size confirm a negative net impact of mergers on unemployment. 
 
Furthermore, Gersbach (2000) derives that intensifying product market compe-
tition leads to more employment in most cases (in particular if it is done via re-
ducing mark-ups or inducing a more rapid expansion of the product mix). Only 
if productivity increases are combined with rigid labour markets (for instance, 
workers are immobile), mixed or negative results might occur. The idea that a 
lessening of competition promotes involuntary unemployment is compatible 
with our reasoning as soon as horizontal mergers actually lead to a lessening of 
competition. Brock & Obst (2008) broaden the scope of welfare analysis of 
                                                            
3   In d'Aspremont et al. (1990) the analysis is done for imperfect price competition.  
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mergers by integrating consumer preferences about the desired degree of mar-
ket concentration, implying that preferences for deconcentrated markets lead to 
a more rigorous optimal horizontal merger policy. However, effects on unem-
ployment are not considered. 
 
Of course, there is a vast literature on welfare effects of horizontal mergers and 
we will draw on the landmark contributions of this field.
4 In particular, we con-
sider a standard Cournot setting and our model resembles in parts the model of 
Salant et al. (1983). However, to our best knowledge, no treatment of the wel-
fare effects of (horizontal) mergers including the welfare effects from a merger-
specific increase in involuntary unemployment is available. 
3.  Synergies, Unemployment and Demand 
Procompetitive advantages from a merger for the merging companies result 
from efficiency gains through synergies. Following the standard view in eco-
nomics, synergies arise from the combination and integration of specific, hard-
to-trade assets of the particular merging firms. This combination allows the new 
merged firm to produce with lower costs compared to the case of separate inde-
pendent firms. Farrell & Shapiro (2001: 693) state the requirement of combin-
ing the firms’ assets as follows: “synergies allow output/cost configurations that 
would not be feasible otherwise.” In the literature on business economics, to-
pologies of synergies are used in differing ways. In some studies (e.g. Chatter-
jee 1986; Seth 1990; Fulghieri & Hodrick 2006), market power effects of hori-
zontal mergers are included, for instance under the label ‘price synergies’. 
However, this received critical reflection as it blurs the distinction between 
anticompetitive (market power) and procompetitive (efficiencies through syn-
ergies) effects of mergers, a distinction that is very useful for analyses from a 
welfare point of view. In accordance with other industrial economics literature, 
                                                            
4   Actually, the literature is much too comprehensive to be summarized in a few paragraphs. For 
elaborate and contemporary overviews see Kaplow & Shapiro (2007); Froeb & Werden (2008); 
Kerber & Schwalbe (2008); Kühn (2008).  
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we therefore do not consider market power effects to be a type of synergies (in-
ter alia Clougherty & Duso 2008). As a consequence, five basic categories of 
synergies can be identified (Chatterjee 1986; Trautwein 1990; Fulghieri & 
Hodrick 2006). 
 
Type of Synergy 
Kind of Cost 
Reduction 
Example(s) 
Production Synergies  economies of scale 
degression of fixed costs; 
convergence to optimal 
capital utilization; etc. 
Operational Synergies  economies of scope 
combining administrative 
functions; integration of 
departments; reduction of 





cient market for corpo-
rate control) 
replacing the target man-
agement by the manage-
ment of the acquirer; etc. 
Financial Synergies  capital costs 
lower interest rates on bor-
rowed capital; improved 





plementary skills / re-
sources 




Irrespective of the type of synergy, a merger-specific increase in productivity 
(efficiency increase) implies that an (assumed) constant output is produced with 
fewer inputs
5 – at the end of the day with fewer input of factors of production. 
Looking at the five categories of synergies, this directly relates to the input fac-
                                                            
5   Alternatively, an assumed constant input allows for a higher output.  
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tor labour in case of production, operational and administrative synergies. In 
case of financial synergies, there is no obvious relation to the factor labour. In 
case of complementarities synergies, the implications for labour input are not 
trivial. 
 
Let us assume horizontal mergers that increase efficiency through production 
and operational synergies.
6 This stands in line with empirical research on mo-
tives and effects of efficiency-enhancing horizontal mergers and acquisitions 
(inter alia Seth 1990; Mukherjee et al. 2004).
7 Assuming partially substitutional 
production functions, the amount of the relative reduction of input factors cor-
responds to the relative price of the input factors. If the relative price of one in-
put factor (say labour) increases, then productivity gains are especially profit-
able if they economize on that factor. This mirrors the rationale that business, 
while seeking to economize on all input factors, puts the strongest efforts be-
hind reducing the most expensive input factor, i.e. increasing its productivity. 
Regarding mergers and acquisitions, this implies that high relative labour price 
induces mergers to focus on the elimination of duplicate jobs in order to de-
crease costs by increasing labour productivity. Typically, deficient labour mar-
ket institutions (overly high reservation wages, excessive labour rights, over-
taxation, overpriced social security, etc.) tend to artificially increase the relative 
price of labour. This interrelation will be addressed in more detail below. 
 
Following the preceding paragraph, we assume that the reduction of costs c of 
the new merged firm compared to its constituent firms is due to a reduction of 
the input factor labour (in relation to a constant output level). Thus, given a 
general production function f with input factors labour (L), capital (K) and other 
inputs (φ), the merger can be expressed in the amount of employed labour pre-
                                                            
6   As the quantitative effect of replacing the target management should not be considerable in terms of 
labour input, we further on neglect this type of synergy. 
7   In contrast, Chatterjee (1992) finds financial synergies to be more important than operational and 
production synergies. Notwithstanding, the latter two represent non-negligible ingredients.  
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merger and post-merger,   and  pre post LL , whereby  pre L  encompasses the sum of em-
ployed labour of the merger-constituent firms: 
 
  ( ,,) ( ,,) post post pre pre fLK f L K ϕ ϕ = , with  post pre LL <  and  ( ,,) ( ,,) post pre cL K cL K ϕ ϕ < . 
 
Efficient mergers imply increased labour productivity, i.e. a constant market 
output is produced with a reduced input of labour, thereby production costs 
have been reduced. Note that this does not necessarily require the merged com-
pany to reduce its labour demand in absolute terms. Due to its increased effi-
ciency, the merged entity might increase its output corresponding to an in-
creased market share. However, this does not contradict our assumption that 
any given market output is produced with less labour input post-merger com-
pared to the pre-merger situation. The merged company merely increases its 
share within the market at the expense of less efficient (i.e. lower labour pro-
ductivity) competitors, implying that the average labour productivity of all pro-
ducers within the relevant market has increased and labour input at any given 
output has market-wide decreased. 
 
The merger-specific cost reduction is present in standard analysis of the welfare 
effect of horizontal mergers and will be included in a standard way in our 
model (section 4). However, the consequent implication on input demand, here: 
labour demand, is usually neglected. This seems to be justified if a full-
employment economy is (implicitly) assumed. Workers and employees that lose 
their job as a consequence of, for instance, operational synergies (reduction of 
staff in post-merger integrated overhead departments) will find a new job in an-
other industry. However, labour markets do not always work perfectly. In a 
considerable number of countries, they are characterized by mismatch prob-
lems, deficient institutions as well as tax and social security systems that artifi-
cially increase the price of labour – leading to involuntary unemployment. In 
line with the empirical research discussed in section 2, we demonstrate that 
dropping the usual (implicit) full employment-economy assumption in favour 
of an involuntary unemployment-economy assumption alters the welfare impli- 
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cations of horizontal mergers. In an economy with involuntary unemployment, 
sclerotic labour markets mean that laid-off workers and employees do not easily 
find a new job and face considerable periods of unemployment instead. Unem-
ployment usually goes along with losses of income.
8 Increasing unemployment 
in such a scenario consequently implies a reduction of income of consumers. 
And thus, by reducing total income Y, involuntary unemployment affects total 
demand D. 
 
To state this more clearly, total income is simply expressed as a function of la-
bour L and all non-labour income elements θ: 
 
  (,) YY L θ = , 
 
with  0 L Y′ >  denoting the first partial derivative of Y with respect to L. The above 
explanations then allow for the reasoning that the effect of an unemployment-
caused reduction of total income on total demand is not passed through one-to-
one. In our following model we, therefore, implicitly assume a so called “pass 
through”-factor a, capturing the effect on the change of total demand D: 
 
  DaY Δ=⋅ Δ, 
 
whereby total demand is a function of the price p, total income Y and other fac-
tors R that determine total demand. The demand of a given industry or in a 
given market  ˆ D is in turn a share of total demand. We assume that  ˆ D evolves 
parallel to total demand, i.e. we assume for reasons of simplicity that consumers 
facing a reduction in income change the size of their shopping basket but not its 
composition. 
 
                                                            
8   A negative income effect occurs even if social security systems provide a subsistence level of in-
come for the unemployed, financed by taxes or social security contributions, as long as that subsis-
tence level is lower than the wage level. In addition, involuntary unemployment reduces demand by 
creating negative expectations about future income.  
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This links employed labour and total demand in a given industry. General in-
voluntary unemployment renders counterbalancing of a discharge of labour 
within that industry (due to merger-specific synergies) by other industries im-
possible. Therefore, the merger causes unemployment to rise and total income 
to fall. The latter, in effect, reduces total demand faced by the merging firms 
and its competitors. 
4.  The Model 
4.1.  Pre-Merger Equilibrium 
We use a simple model of Cournot oligopoly with homogenous goods. Inverse 
demand  ˆ D is given by  () p XR Y b X =−, where X is total industry output, p is 
price,  Y is total income, R denotes all other factors than total income, and 
()0 pX ′ <  denoting the first derivative of price with respect to total industry out-
put. The number of firms is exogenous and given by n. Firm i’s output is given 
by  i x  and 
1
n
i i X x
= =∑ . It is further assumed that the n firms have equal marginal 
costs c and no fixed costs.
9 
 
In the standard Cournot equilibrium, every firm i maximizes its profits, 
(,)[() ] iii i x yp X c x π =− , over its output  i x , given its rivals’ output  i y . It follows that 
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9   Positive fixed costs do not change the general analysis and implications, besides enforcing the be-
low examined effects.  
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4.2.  Post-Merger Equilibrium 
Now, two of the previously existing n firms merge, thereby reducing the mar-
ginal costs of the new entity (insider I) due to synergies to cε, with 0 < ε < 1. 
The marginal costs of the remaining n – 2 firms (outsiders O) remain at c. It is 
assumed that the synergies rest on the economization of labour input. Due to 
sclerotic labour markets, involuntary unemployment is increased and this 
causes total income to fall to YY < % . The amount of Y % comprises the “pass 
through”-effect of an unemployment-caused reduction of total income on de-
mand in the modelled market: the higher is  Y %, the lower is the proportion of 
change in total income passed through onto the relevant market. Thus, inverse 
demand is now given by  () p XR Y b X =− %% % % , where  X %  is new total industry output, 
p %  is the new price,  ()0 pX ′ < % % , and the other parameters R stay the same as in the 
pre-merger case. 
 
In the new Cournot equilibrium, outputs of the insider and the outsiders are 
given by 
(2 ) ( 1) (2 )
  and   IO
RY c nc RY c
xx
bn bn
εε ε +− + − +−
==
%%
, respectively, with  IO x x > . 
Thus, total industry output of 
(1 )( 2 )
(2 ) IO
RY n c n
Xx n x
bn
ε − −+ −
=+− =
%
%  results in the 









% % . 
 
For  () p X % %  to be higher than  () p X  it must hold that 
 
(2)  () ( 2 ) ( 1 ) nR Y R Y R Y n c n c ε −+ > + − + %% . 
 
The partial derivates of the difference given in (2) show that a higher value of Y % 
and ε (i.e. a smaller shift in the demand curve and the insiders’ cost function) as 
well as lower values of n and c (i.e. fewer players in the market and lower mar- 
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ket-wide marginal costs) support a price increase due to the merger.
10 Thereby, 
(very) low market-wide marginal costs convey a lower price-reducing potential 
of synergies (compared to the effect of increased market power). 
 
Total welfare (W % ) is now given by the sum of consumer surplus, the profit of 
the insider and the profits of the  2 n−  outsider firms. Thus, 
2
2
[(1 )( 2 ) ]
2
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 result in 
 
(3)  (2 )
I O WC S n π π =++ − %% %  
22 2 22 2 2 3 1 1
2 22
2
() ( 1 ) [ 2 ( 1)] [ (2 )(2 ) (2 ) (1 ) ]
.
RY n cRY n n c n n
bn




4.3.  Total Welfare Effect 
The merger’s effect on total welfare is determined by the comparison of post-
merger and pre-merger total welfare,  WWW Δ =− % . It is obvious that this com-
parison will lead to a very complex expression that cannot be interpreted in a 
trivial way and that does not allow for an easy generalizing condition.
11 
 
Recalling our aim to show total welfare impacts of mergers that include a nega-
tive effect of synergies on total demand, we first should mention that those 
mergers display the “normal” impact of mergers in such a Cournot-setting, i.e. 
the mergers’ effects on total welfare under the above conditions with the “nor-
mal” unaffected demand function (this is due to the partial derivative of W %  with 
                                                            
10    The partial derivatives of the difference in (4) are given by: 
( 1 ) 0, ( 1 ) 0,  ( 1 ) 0,  ( 1 ) 2 0 n R n c RY RY c n nc Y
εε ε ε
∂∂ ∂ ∂ =+ > =+ > = − −−< = − + − < ∂∂ ∂ ∂
%
% . 
11    The latter is possible if the effect on consumer surplus is isolated:  0 CS CS CS Δ=−> %%   ⇔ 
2 [( 1 ) 2 ] ( ) cn n R Y R Y R Y εε −+ −> − + %% .  
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respect to Y %,  0 WY ∂∂ > %% ).
12 Thus, ignoring effects on total demand attenuates 
(and possibly reverses) negative total welfare effects and overestimates positive 
total welfare effects. This emphasizes the importance of an inclusion of de-
mand-side effects into a welfare-maximizing merger policy. 
 
We simulate some welfare effects (with different parameter constellations) of 
mergers that include demand-side effects in the Appendix. Thereby, the results 
follow „normal“ Cournot-settings, i.e. it is easier to conclude a negative welfare 
effect of those mergers. A smaller shift of the demand curve, a higher reduction 
of marginal costs and a higher number of active firms lower and may offset this 
negative total welfare effect. 
 
Furthermore, a very steep demand curve (higher values of b) leads to a decrease 
of the absolute value of  W Δ  (this is due to the same qualitative effect of an in-
creased b on W and W % ). It should be noted that a positive total welfare effect is 
based on increased profits of the firms; consumers only do not suffer from those 
mergers if there is almost no demand-side effect, the number of active firms in 
the market is very high and the insider realizes an excessive reduction in mar-
ginal costs. 
5.  Policy Implications and Further Research Questions 
In summary, we find that efficiency benefits from horizontal mergers are sub-
stantially decreased, if involuntary unemployment exists. However, in full em-
ployment economies, demand-side effects remain negligible. This result stands 
in line with the available empirical evidence reported in section 2, finding nega-
tive employment effects of mergers in unemployment economies but not in full 
employment economies. Now, what are the implications of our theoretical 
analysis? We structure them in three categories: (i) policy implications in a nar-
                                                            
12   A sufficient condition for  0 WY ∂∂ > %%  is given by: 
22 2 (1 ) RYn c R n −> % .  
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row sense, (ii) more general policy implications and (iii) demand for further re-
search. 
5.1.  Narrow Policy Implications 
Our model demonstrates that a welfare-maximising merger control agency 
should not neglect demand-side effects of mergers in the face of involuntary 
unemployment. The total welfare effect of a synergy-causing merger where the 
synergies rely on a post-merger economisation on labour input is systematically 
decreased in such an economic environment. Mergers that produce a suffi-
ciently small positive welfare effect when ignoring the demand effect can be 
welfare-reducing when taking demand-side effects into account. Thus, ignoring 
demand-side effects is likely to cause some false positives (allowances of wel-
fare-reducing mergers) in an unemployment economy. 
 
Since the demand-side effect only affects economies with involuntary unem-
ployment, the policy implications are ‘only’ relevant for merger control authori-
ties in such economies (and not for such in full employment economies). In 
economies with involuntary unemployment, the consideration of demand-side 
effects implies caution towards the inclusion of cost-decreasing effects in the 
evaluation of merger proposals (since they were at least partially eroded by the 
decrease in demand). In other words, merger control authorities should be more 
careful to allow an otherwise anticompetitive merger due to (productive) effi-
ciency gains through (labour-input related) synergies than merger control au-
thorities in full employment economies. 
 
Note, however, the counter-argument that it might be more appropriate to attack 
the labour market deficiencies with economic policy instruments than adjusting 
merger control. While possessing merit from an ideal perspective, labour mar-
ket reforms that turn persistently sclerotic labour markets into perfectly worka-
ble ones seem to be somewhat unrealistic, probably due to political economy 
reasons. As a consequence, a merger control authority in an economy character- 
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ized by involuntary unemployment must deal with the situation as it is and as 
long as it remains. Under these conditions, neglecting demand-side effects 
might further decrease welfare. 
 
A point of qualification must be considered. The share of the income loss due to 
increased involuntary unemployment that actually transfers to demand in the 
market of the concentration might be rather small and in many cases even look 
negligible. However, this does not imply that the negative effect does not occur 
since other industries are adversely affected instead. For reasons of simplicity, 
we waived an integration of cross-market effects in our theoretical analysis, 
since it merely scatters the effects (without effecting their total scale) and com-
plicates the analysis but does not change the results.  
5.2.  More General Policy Implications 
It is a widespread opinion among economists that merger control should focus 
only on competition effects and exclude other ‘non-competition’ factors like 
preserving diversity of firms and products, promoting market integration, fair-
ness considerations as well as employment effects (Motta 2004: 17-30; Carlton 
& Perloff 2005: 634-637).
13 However, our model shows that an unrestricted 
welfare goal of antitrust policy cannot exclude employment effects. If involun-
tary unemployment exists, then the employment effects of a merger influence 
welfare and, thus, belong into the welfare evaluation of a merger proposal. In 
this regard, employment effects do not represent a non-competition factor if 
competition is equalled with (total) welfare! 
 
Taking a total welfare standard for merger control (exemplary for other compe-
tition policy areas) seriously, implies that the distinction between ‘competition’ 
and ‘non-competition’ effects becomes somewhat blurred since (almost) every 
                                                            
13   These textbooks reflect the mainstream thought on both sides of the Atlantic. For recent and more 
controversial contributions to this issue see inter alia Schmidt 2001; Fox 2003; Foer 2006; Heyer 
2006; Carlton 2007; Budzinski 2008; Kirchner 2008; Kerber 2009.  
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merger-specific effect somehow affects welfare. This is particularly visible in 
our example: technically, the difference between cost efficiencies and unem-
ployment-related income effects is merely that in the first case the supply func-
tion is shifted while in the second case the demand function is shifted. There is 
no obvious or trivial reason to discriminate between these two effects in terms 
of ‘competition’ versus ‘non-competition’ factor. 
5.3.  Demand for Further Research 
While our model only refers to conditional employment effects, the overall im-
plication might be more far-reaching. The number of effects from mergers that 
possibly affects welfare in some ways might be quite extensive. For instance in 
a recent study, Garmaise & Moskowitz (2006) find empirical evidence that bank 
mergers generally yield effects like income reduction and increasing poverty 
crime – both of which certainly negatively affect total welfare. Similar consid-
erations seem plausible for other so-called ‘non-competition’ factors like pre-
serving diversity of firms and products or promoting market integration 
whereas in cases of others, like fairness considerations, it might seem more im-
plausible. In any case, theoretical literature on the welfare effects of such kinds 
of merger consequences is largely missing up to date. Further research is neces-
sary to fill this gap and complete the welfare analysis of mergers. 
 
Given the difficulties of assessing the welfare effects in real-world merger cases 
even in the currently dominating two-dimensional framework (market power 
effect and supply-side cost-reduction effect), another research question might 
gain relevance: do unlimited welfare standards represent an appropriate and 
wise goal for competition policy in theory and in practice? 
6.  Concluding Summary 
Standard welfare analysis of horizontal mergers usually refers to two effects: 
the anticompetitive market power effect reduces welfare by enabling firms to  
20 
charge prices above marginal costs whereas the procompetitive efficiency effect 
increases welfare by reducing the costs of production (synergies). However, 
demand-side effects of synergies are usually neglected. We introduce them into 
a standard oligopoly model of horizontal merger by assuming a (empirically 
supported) decrease in labour demand due to merger-specific synergies and de-
rive welfare effects. We find that efficiency benefits from horizontal mergers 
are substantially decreased, if involuntary unemployment exists. However, in 
full employment economies, demand-side effects remain negligible. These 
model results stand in line with existing empirical research.  
 
Policy conclusions include that merger control authorities in economies with 
involuntary unemployment should be (more) reluctant to allow market power 
increasing mergers (compared to such in full employment economies) because 
of supply-side efficiency gains since they might be offset by welfare-reducing 
demand-side effects. In a more general context, the presented analysis indicates 
the necessity for a reappraisal of the popular distinction between ‘competition’ 
and ‘non-competition’ factors in merger control. Furthermore, it shows that ad-
ditional research about welfare effects of mergers and the effects of unlimited 
welfare standards on merger control policy is needed.  
21 
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8.  Appendix 
N c  ε R  b  Y  % Y   W Δ  
4 1  0.95  1  0.75  10  9.995  -1.0814 
4 1  0.8  1  0.75  10  9.995  -0.4833 
4 1  0.68  1  0.75  10  9.995  0.0262 
4 1  0.68  1  1.75  10  9.995  0.0112 
              
4 1  0.75  1  0.75  10  9.995  -0.2744 
5 1  0.75  1  0.75  10  9.995  0.067 
5 1  0.75  1  1.25  10  9.995  0.0402 
5 1  0.75  1  1.75  10  9.995  0.0287 
              
4 1  0.75  1  1.75  10  9.995  -0.1176 
4 1  0.9  1  1.75  10  9.995  -0.3801 
              
4 1  0.9  1  1  10  9.995  -0.6651 
4 1  0.9  1  1  10  9.9  -1.465 
              
5 1  0.9  1  1  10  9.9  -1.1328 
5 1  0.9  1  1.75  10  9.9  -0.6473 
6 1  0.9  1  1.75  10  9.9  -0.5642 
6 1  0.9  1  1  10  9.9  -0.9874 
6 1  0.9  1  0.75  10  9.9  -1.3165 
              
6 1  0.83  1  1.25  10  9.995  -0.017 
6 1  0.83  1  1.25  10  9.999  0.0111 
6 1  0.83  1  0.75  10  9.999  0.0186 
6 1  0.9  1  0.75  10  9.999  -0.1654 
6 1  0.9  1  1.25  10  9.999  -0.0992 
8 1  0.89  1  0.75  10  9.999  0.0107 
8 1  0.89  1  1.25  10  9.999  0.0064 
              
6 1  0.98  1  1.25  10  9.999  -0.2175  
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6 1  0.98  1  1.75  10  9.999  -0.1554 
5 1  0.98  1  1.75  10  9.999  -0.2629 
              
3 1  0.98  1  1.75  10  9.999  -1.0837 
3 1  0.9  1  1.75  10  9.999  -0.8975 
3 1  0.9  1  1  10  9.999  -1.5707 
              
3 1  0.9  1  1  10  9.9  -2.3626 
3 1  0.53  1  1  10  9.999  0.0381 
3 1  0.53  1  1.75  10  9.999  0.0217 
              
3 1  0.53  1  1.75  10  9.995  0.003 
3 1  0.75  1  1.75  10  9.995  -0.5549 
 
For our simple simulation of the welfare effects of mergers that include de-
mand-side effects, we generally concentrate on the variation of the parameters 
n, ε, b and Y %. All other parameters are held constant. 
 
In the above table the last column indicates the net total welfare effect and posi-
tive (negative) values of  W Δ  indicate a positive (negative) welfare effect of 
those mergers. The simulation is partitioned in several parts to isolate some ef-
fects of the respective parameters: 
 
•  At first, increased efficiencies due to the merger (i.e. reducing marginal 
costs) lower and may offset (for very high efficiencies) a negative welfare 
effect. The last row indicates that the absolute value of  W Δ  decreases ac-
cording to a steeper demand curve. 
 
•  A higher number of active firms raise the critical level of efficiency gains, 




•  The third part, again, shows the effect of a steeper demand curve on the 
absolute value of  W Δ  (these values must be compared with the corre-
sponding values of the first part). 
 
•  Increasing the demand-side effect, i.e. lowering Y %, has an unambiguously 
negative effect on total welfare. Increasing the number of firms (see the 
fifth part) only attenuates this effect that, again, also holds for a steeper 
demand curve. 
 
•  In the sixth part it is demonstrated that even for a negligible shift of the 
demand curve and a ‘normal’ oligopoly situation the efficiency effects 
crucially determine the possibility of a positive total welfare effect. Even 
for such a number of firms the reduction in marginal costs must be com-
paratively high. The last two parts indicate the extreme magnitude needed 
to positively affect total welfare if the number of active firms is very low. 
 
In summary, a smaller shift of the demand curve, a higher reduction of marginal 
costs and a higher number of active firms lower and may offset a negative total 
welfare effect. Furthermore, a very steep demand curve (higher values of b) 
leads to a decrease of the absolute value of  W Δ .  
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